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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to compare Sam Shepard’s Fool for Love, published in 1983, 
and its cinematic adaptation directed by Robert Altman, released in 1985, in terms 
of the notion of possible worlds (in the philosophically-oriented branch of cognitive 
poetics). In her discussion of possible worlds, Marie-Laure Ryan proposes a typolo-
gy of accessibility relations (identity of properties, identity of inventory, compatibili-
ty of inventory, chronological, physical, taxonomic, logical, analytical, and linguistic 
compatibility) in order to account for how the sense of the reality of our actual 
world reverberates in fictional worlds. Ryan also offers another typology, that is, the 
internal structure of the fictional world (knowledge worlds, intention worlds, wish 
worlds, obligation worlds, and fantasy worlds) to show how the characters’ different 
conceptions of the world define and build up the narrative structure of fiction. It is 
argued that the change of medium – drama into film in this case – results in some 
changes in the possible worlds projected, since verbality and visuality give rise to 
some differences in terms of modes of perception. Also discussed is the significance 
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in this regard of the spatio-temporal scope, which is confined in the case of drama, 
a genre often conceived to be performed, whereas in a movie the director is able to 
expand this scope as the occasion demands.
Keywords: Sam Shepard, Fool for Love, Robert Altman, Marie-Laure Ryan, adapta-
tion, narratology, possible worlds
Introduction
In her theorization of film adaptation, Linda Hutcheon proposes three inter-
dependent perspectives. In one of them, she declares:
An adaptation is an announced and extensive transposition of a particu-
lar work or works. This “transcoding” can involve a shift of medium (a 
poem to a film) or genre (an epic to a novel), or a change of frame and 
therefore context: telling the same story from a different point of view, for 
instance, can create a manifestly different interpretation. Transposition 
can also mean a shift in ontology from the real to the fictional, from a his-
torical account or biography to a fictionalized narrative or drama. (7-8)
One can, we argue, consider Hutcheon’s formulation of transposition or 
transcoding in terms of a conspicuous shift in “possible worlds,” as well. Almost 
always there appear new scenes in conjunction with the characters’ different 
conceptions of the world that tend to define and build up the (new) narrative 
structure in the new medium transcoded. Deploying Marie-Laure Ryan’s Pos-
sible Worlds model, the present paper aims to shed light on an adaptation of 
drama into film, in this case Sam Shepard’s Fool for Love and Robert Altman’s 
adaptation. It is argued that the film makes some changes in the possible worlds 
projected, since verbality and visuality give rise to some differences in modes of 
perception. Also discussed is the significance in this regard of the spatio-tem-
poral scope which is confined in the case of drama, a genre often conceived to 
be performed, but is expandable in a movie as required.
The Concept of Possible Worlds 
“Possible worlds” theory can be regarded as a subcategory of cognitive po-
etics, which itself is broadly concerned with how mind and language work. It 
constitutes the more philosophical tendency in cognitive poetics. This theo-
ry can be traced back to the seventeenth century and Leibniz’s concern with 
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philosophical logic. Leibniz maintains that there exist “an infinity of possible 
worlds . . . as thoughts in the mind of God,” and among these worlds, only one 
is the actual world (333-4). Later, this gave new direction to structuralists of the 
mid-twentieth century and persuaded them to form an alliance with the later 
post-structuralists. Roland Barthes, the prominent structuralist theorist in the 
first phase of his career, for instance, announced that “there are countless forms 
of narrative in the world” (237). A few years after Barthes and since the 1970s, a 
number of literary critics (Umberto Eco, Lubomir Doležel, Thomas Pavel, and 
Marie-Laure Ryan) began to extend this notion to the field of narratology, liter-
ary semantics, and literary theory. Adapting the theories mainly developed in 
logic, these scholars have developed a semantics of fictionality, arguing that lit-
erary texts project semantic domains that must be considered as actual possible 
worlds. In other words, these worlds must be considered as actual the moment 
we as readers immerse ourselves into a work of fiction. In line with this, Gerald 
Prince remarks:
Narratives comprise temporally ordered sequences of states of affairs that 
are taken to be actual/factual (“what happens”) and that are linked to oth-
er states of affairs considered non-actual or counterfactual and constitut-
ed by the mental activity of various characters (their beliefs, wishes, plans, 
hallucinations, fantasies, etc.). (77) 
Thus, “as an interdisciplinary approach,” in Ruth Ronen’s terms, the notion 
of “possible worlds” helps us understand how the semantics of fictionality pro-
pelled by the literary text is an “Alternative Possible World” (henceforth APW) 
that operates as the actual world the moment the reader is immersed in a work 
of fiction. This is what Ryan terms “recentering” that makes the reader enter “a 
new system of actuality and possibility.” That is, “not only one new actual world, 
but a variety of APWs revolving around it” exist (22). Thus an event or a series 
of affairs are possible so long as they do not contradict the laws of logic. Among 
all the worlds that exist, one holds the center and the rest of “possible worlds” 
are connected to it by a relation of accessibility. Yet, the question is which one 
has the right to be called the authentic actual world? From an absolutist view-
point (e.g. Rescher), the central actual world (henceforth AW) is ontologically 
autonomous, and the others are the products of imagination, dream, etc., and 
thus counted as “possible worlds.” 
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Ryan’s Typology of the Internal Structure of Fictional Worlds 
For describing the internal structure of “the textual universe as a dynamic 
combination of textual actual world (henceforth TAW), on the one hand, and 
the different types of alternative possible worlds formulated by characters, on 
the other hand” (Semino 86-7), Ryan suggests that the possible worlds as pri-
vate worlds or virtual domains exist in the thoughts or minds of the characters 
(110). Moreover, Ryan expatiates on the characters’ mental activities that are 
composed of two sorts of elements: “some involve truth-functional and fact-de-
fining propositions while some others do not” (111). As for the first group of 
propositions, Ryan enumerates “‘thinking that p,’ ‘hoping that p,’ and ‘intending 
p,’” and in regard with the other group of propositions, she offers “the emo-
tions, subjective judgments, and fleeting perceptions before they are turned into 
knowledge” (111). These propositions have to be integrated to constitute “the 
image of a world” (111). 
Ryan proposes that there are some APWs that constitute the narrative uni-
verse and the conflicts within them engender the plot development and its tella-
bility. Additionally, Margot Norris declares that by modification of the fictional 
modalities Marie-Laure Ryan restricts them “to the private worlds in the minds 
of characters rather than by treating them as operatives of world- construction” 
(9). The private worlds are as follows:
1.   Textual Actual World (TAW): what is presented as true and real in the 
story;
2.   Knowledge World (K-World): what the characters know or believe to be 
the case with the T/AW;
3.   Prospective Extension of K-World: what characters expect or hold to be 
future developments in TAW;
4.   Obligation World (O-World): the commitments and prohibitions con-
stituted by the social rules and moral principles which the characters 
are subject to;
5.   Wish World (W-World): the wishes and desires of the characters;
6.   Intention World (I-World): the plans and goals of the characters;
7.   Fantasy Universes (F-Universes): the dreams and fantasies of the char-
acters and the fictions they construct. (Ryan 113-123)
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Ryan’s Typology of Accessibility Relations
In logic, particularly in Kripke’s formulations, possibility and accessibility 
are used interchangeably (see Ryan, “Possible Worlds and Accessibility Rela-
tions” 557). Ryan, likewise, maintains that a “world is possible if it satisfies the 
logical laws of non-contradiction and of the excluded middle: (p OR -p) AND 
NOT (p AND -p) (A proposition must be true or false, and not both at the 
same time)” (“Possible Worlds and Accessibility Relations” 557). The accessi-
bility relations included in Ryan’s framework are listed “in decreasing order of 
stringency” (Possible Worlds 2). In other words, fictional worlds that only break 
rules from the top of the list are closer to the actual world than fictional worlds 
that also break rules from the bottom of the list. The crucial point, however, is 
that Ryan’s model makes it possible to describe fictional worlds in terms of a 
scale of increasing distance from the actual world. However, Ryan suggests that 
the notion of textual world “presents a referential domain,” and that it is also “a 
mental representation constructed on the basis of the propositions asserted in 
or implied by the text. The world of a text of narrative fiction can be thought 
of as a container filled with the characters and objects referred to by the text” 
(“Impossible Worlds” 369; emphasis in the original). Ryan Adds that a fictional 
text has references to a world despite the fact that this world cannot exist in-
dependently of the text because “the conventions of fiction allow language to 
create objects by merely mentioning them. As in all uses of language, the men-
tal construction of fictional worlds relies heavily on inferences” (“Impossible 
Worlds” 369; emphasis added). Therefore, under the influence of David Lewis‘ 
“indexical theory,” Ryan relies on the text itself and whatever references or in-
ferences it gives rise to as true and by and large welcomes any inconsistencies, 
in the sense of Logicians’ use of the term, and as a cognitive theorist prioritizes 
the readers of the literary fiction, for they “have a broader of sense of worldness 
than logicians, and because they do not treat inconsistencies as an excuse for 
giving up the attempt to make inferences” (“Impossible Worlds” 369; emphasis 
added). Accordingly, Ryan proposes nine types of accessibility relations in order 
to account for how fictional worlds echo the sense of the reality of our actual 
world. The list follows as:
A.   Identity of properties (abbreviated as A/properties): TAW is accessi-
ble from AW if the objects common to TAW and AW have the same 
properties. 
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B.   Identity of inventory (B/same inventory): TAW is accessible from AW if 
TAW and AW are furnished by the same objects. 
C.   Compatibility of inventory (C/expanded inventory): TAW is accessible 
from AW if TAW’S inventory includes all the members of AW, as well 
as some native members.
D.   Chronological compatibility (D/chronology): TAW is accessible from 
AW if it takes no temporal relocation for a member of AW to con-
template the entire history of TAW. (This condition means that TAW 
is not older than AW, i.e., its present is not posterior in absolute time 
to AW’s present. We can contemplate facts of the past from the view-
point of the present, but since the future holds projections rather than 
facts, it takes a relocation beyond the time of their occurrence to re-
gard as facts those events located in the future.) 
E.   Physical compatibility (E/natural laws): TAW is accessible from AW if 
they share natural laws. 
F.   Taxonomic compatibility (F/taxonomy): TAW is accessible from AW 
if both worlds contain the same species, and the species are charac-
terized by the same properties. (F usually follows from E, but some 
divorces of taxonomic and physical compatibility do occur and will be 
discussed below.) 
G.   Logical compatibility (G/logic): TAW is accessible from AW if both 
worlds respect the principles of non-contradiction and of excluded 
middle.
H.   Analytical compatibility (H/analytical): TAW is accessible from AW if 
they share analytic truths, i.e., if objects designated by the same words 
have the same essential properties. 
I.   Linguistic compatibility (//linguistic): TAW is accessible from AW if the 
language by which TAW is described can be understood in AW. (Ryan, 
558-59)
Moreover, the other relevant central concept is “the principle of minimal de-
parture” in that the expectation is the resemblance of TAW to AW in all aspects, 
whereby the TAW is accessible from AW at most.
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Discussion
Sam Shepard’s Fool for Love (1983) – along with Buried Child (1977), Curse 
of the Starving Class (1977), True West (1980), and A Lie of the Mind (1985) – is 
considered to be the ultimate “family play.” However, the techniques practiced 
in Fool for Love are more intricate since the play, identical to Buried Child, hints 
at a turn in Shepard’s writing away from the antirealism of his earlier texts. It 
focuses on the memories of the past intermittently narrated by the characters, 
especially Eddie and May, in order to delve into the family history. Fool for Love 
is a “more expressionistic work toward an almost hyper-realism that zooms in 
on the idiosyncratic lives of ordinary people struggling with extraordinary con-
flicts” (Johnson 167). There exists a constant fluctuation between the real and 
the hyperreal as the play shifts from memory to the truth of everyday life. In his 
1985 adaptation of Fool for Love, Robert Altman, well-known in the filmmak-
ing world as an auteuristic director, crafted a slightly different cinematic ver-
sion. Reflecting on the auteur theory or theory of authorship in Robert Altman’s 
oeuvre, Robert Self believes that
Robert Altman films illustrate Michel Foucault’s contention that the con-
cept of “author-function” is “tied to the legal and institutional systems that 
circumscribe, determine, and articulate the realm of discourses . . . it does 
not refer, purely and simply, to an actual individual insofar as it simulta-
neously gives rise to a variety of egos and to a series of subject positions 
that individuals of any class may come to occupy.” (4)
Recently, a documentary has been released about Altman that introduces the 
term Altmanesque. The discourses mentioned associated with the term are de-
lineated as “(1) characterized by naturalism, social criticism, [and] subversion 
of genres; (2) not conforming to predictable norms; [and] (3) indestructible.” 
Altman’s other recurring discourse is the priority of the memory and the past on 
the grounds that Altman’s recourse to the flashbacks, or insistence on the stream 
of consciousness very nearly manipulates the original screenplay. 
Altman himself confesses: “I have a bad reputation with writers, developed 
over the years: ‘Oh, he doesn’t do what you write.’ . . . Ring Lardner was very 
pissed off with me” (qtd. in Thompson 18). Fool for Love is no exception. Some 
critics have discussed the differences between the play and its adaptation, and 
by and large treated it adversely. Johan Callens, for instance, declares that “the 
movie add[s] prominence to the play’s Western elements, simultaneously af-
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firming and debunking them” (69). Similarly, Andrew Sarris, the acclaimed film 
critic, deprecates the film, stating: “Quite simply, a very effective play has been 
stretched out into a very ineffective movie. . . . What was ritualized, stylized, or 
merely mentioned on the stage has been rendered with a brooding ‘realism’ on 
the screen” (qtd. in Saddik 206). However, manifestly rejecting Hollywoodian 
premises, Robert Altman, particularly in The Player (1992), and Sam Shepard, 
in Angel City (1976) and True West (1980), go well with each other. As far as Fool 
for Love is concerned, though, each of these “authors” creates his own distinct 
ontological constitution within a different medium. Each of them constructs 
a unique narrative universe allied with discrete possible worlds. In what fol-
lows, we will try to shed light on some aspects of these different versions of 
“world-building.” Shepard’s Fool for Love has four characters. The lovers, Eddie 
and May, are half-siblings involved in an incestuous relationship. The Old Man, 
their common father, is dead but is fully visible on the stage and often talks 
to Eddie or comments upon the happenings. Martin is May’s would-be date 
whose presence stirs up the significant old memories, particularly divulging the 
innermost secret through Eddie’s and May’s narratives (that they are actually 
half brother and sister, and the Old Man is their father). In addition to these 
four principal characters, Robert Altman adds seven other characters to the film 
version – Mr. Valdez, May’s mother, Eddie’s mother, teenage May, teenage Ed-
die, young May, and the Countess – which serves to focus to a greater degree 
on the AW extended beyond the stage and to make the plot more accessible. 
This contributes to the consolidation of “the principle of minimal departure.” 
Shepard’s play starts in medias res in a confined setting, in a motel somewhere in 
the desert. In fact, as with a realist setting, TAW of the play is populated by the 
same species as AW and the characters who are ordinary people engaged in the 
familiar pursuits of everyday life. This is decisively in line with the “reader’s real 
world knowledge and experience but it may also exceed the real world” beyond 
its possibilities (Hart 113). Yet, there are incongruities, the first of which occurs 
in reference to the Old Man whose presence on the stage does not give the im-
pression of being a real character. As Shepard’s stage direction has it,
He [the Old Man] exists only in the minds of MAY and EDDIE, even 
though they might talk to him directly and acknowledge his physical 
presence. THE OLD MAN treats them as though they all existed in the 
same time and place. (Shepard 20)
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In this unnatural narrative, the relation G/logical is severed in this case, since 
there exists no respect for the principles of non-contradiction and of excluded 
middle; as long as this principle is not maintained, a world does not maintain 
some kind of connection to the actual world. Thus, we are in a logically incon-
sistent world where people can be dead and alive at the same time. “Appari-
tions, waif-like beings, and corpses occasionally infiltrate Shepard’s stages,” says 
Matthew Roudané (279). In this case, the Old Man coincidentally exists and 
does not exist, like “Schrödinger’s cat”,1 which is, of course, logically impossible. 
There are other similar examples in Shepard’s plays: a Ghost Girl in Mad Dog 
Blues (1971), Pop, or Stanley Hewitt Moss in the one-act Holy Ghostly (1970), 
and Henry Moss in Late Henry Moss (2000). This would problematize the on-
tological boundaries that are blurred and opaque here. This means that the play 
projects worlds in which the boundaries between ontologically disparate do-
mains are transgressed – the world of the dead and the world of the living. 
Conversely, Robert Altman starts the movie in the motel grounds and the 
desert, diverging from the dramaturgical techniques prevalent in Shepard’s 
theater. In the movie’s beginning, the empty, fertile desert is shown in a pano-
ramic view, and gradually the viewer’s perspective shifts to an image of a motel 
from above. The Old Man lives in a trailer surrounded with the rubbish behind 
the motel, playing the harmonica. His physical presence is more emphasized 
in the movie, or, to put it another way, he is shown mostly in the flesh. In one 
scene, for instance, the Old Man rummages through Eddie’s truck, apparently 
looking for liquor, stirring Eddie to run out and chase him away, screaming: 
“Hey, what the hell you doin’ in that truck?” In some other scenes, he as a bum 
wanders through the motel, making eye contact and interacting with Eddie and 
May. Hence, the director (un)consciously maintains the relation G/logical, or at 
least reduces its intensity to make head for the principle of minimal departure.
Another example of incongruity, not present in the play but shown in the 
film, is the scene in which the Old Man, in his youth, along with May’s mother 
and the teenage May, are seen in one of the motel bungalows. The adult May, in 
1  See Marie-Laure Ryan, “Narrative/Science Entanglements: On the Thousand and One Literary 
Lives of Schrödinger’s Cat,” Narrative 19 (2011): 171-186. Ryan uses Schrödinger’s cat as a test 
case for the study of the relations between narrative and science. She deploys the rules and inter-
pretations pertaining to quantum mechanics of Schrödinger such as the paradox-denial inter-
pretation, the split-reality interpretation, the Copenhagen interpretation, Wigner’s Friend, and 
many worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics, and tries to link them to narrative practices. 
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parapsychological fashion, witnesses teenage May. While the little girl is swing-
ing, the adult May pursues her and hugs her but May’s mother makes a dash for 
the teenage May and takes her back. Evidently, within a realistic fashion so far, 
the postmodern locale discordantly forges an impossible world insomuch as the 
past and the present are mingled. Clearly, chronological compatibility, in the way 
Ryan has defined it, does not apply to this case, since there is no mention here 
of science fiction or stories about the future.2 In Altman’s version, it is regarded 
as time-travel hence, the relations E/natural laws and G/logical are manifestly 
lifted. The former is severed because based on natural laws the human reason is 
not cognizant of such happenings within his/her own actual universe. As for the 
latter, it turns out to be contradictory and perplexing for the viewer to recognize 
the past and the present simultaneously in a single image, hence, the severing of 
the relation G/Logical in the movie again. 
In regard with the APWs and their conflicts, both the play and the film pro-
ject some fantasy universes with their own distinct TAW and ontological inde-
pendence. In double recentering mode or “[I]n the space-travel mode,” Ryan 
argues, “consciousness relocates itself to another world and, taking advantage 
of the indexical definition of actuality, reorganizes the entire universe of being 
around this virtual reality” (Narrative as Virtual Reality 103). In the play, the 
reader/audience merely immerses into the other TAW and listens to some sto-
ries, narrated in Eddie and May’s recollections, wherein there are some accounts 
of their childhood centered on the Old Man. May challenges Eddie’s K-world in 
his narration by remarking that “[N]one of it’s true. . . . He’s had this weird, sick 
idea for years now and it’s totally made up” and adds that “[Y]ou don’t even know 
which end [in this story] is up anymore” (51). Eddie, in like manner, challenges 
May’s K-world and addresses the Old Man thus: “She’s lying” (51). Thus, in this 
case, in Ryan’s terms, there appears a particular form of “enigma, which stems 
from an incomplete K-world with well-defined area of indeterminacy” (121). As 
such, the reliability of the narrators is questioned, though it still obtains. In the 
film version, however, the director in the same scene makes some significant 
changes through which the viewers are bound to wholly lose their trust in the 
narrators. The stories or fantasy universes that exist in the minds of the Old Man 
2  Such scenes are rare in literature. Some memorable examples are found in Audrey Niffenegger’s 
novel The Time Traveler’s Wife (2003). The novel partly partakes of the genre of science fiction; 
yet, an identical situation is designated where Henry, a time traveler, travels backwards, meets his 
younger self, and relates to him physically. Consequently, D/chronological is partially relaxed.
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and Eddie as K-worlds are “visualized and validated in the film, giving it a reality 
of its own, apart from individual consciousness” (Saddik 213). Ontologically 
speaking, Altman’s adaptation is an autonomous, exclusive one due to the fact 
that by the time Eddie or May narrate happenings in their past; coincidentally, 
the viewer not only listens to them but also sees the images of their flashbacks. 
Yet, almost always whatever is narrated does not fall in with the image shown 
on the screen. The Old Man’s recollections, for instance, correspond to those 
stated in the play, but the images are to some extent divergent. The Old Man tells 
May about the night they were traveling in a car. “We’d been drivin’ all night and 
you were sound asleep in the front. And all of a sudden you woke up crying. . . . 
Woke your mom right up and she climbed over the seat in back there with you,” 
he says (Fool for Love 32). Yet, the flashback shown questions the Old Man’s 
K-world because May’s mother is awake and is laughing with the Old Man, and 
the teenage May, in like manner, is silent and does not cry at all. 
The same occurs in Eddie’s story. Eddie remembers that after the Old Man 
bought a bottle of liquor, “he opened the bottle up and offered it to me. Be-
fore he even took a drink, he offered it to me first. And I took it and drank it 
and handed it back to him” (Fool for Love 32). This memory, however, does not 
match its image in the movie since the Old Man does not offer Eddie anything. 
Similarly, in another example, Eddie mentions that “we were completely silent 
the whole time. Never said a word to each other” (Fool for Love 32), whereas in 
the movie they are talking to each other. Both in the case of the Old Man and 
that of Eddie, then, there is a conflict between the K-world and its reference 
world in the flashbacks in images that give rise to the distortion of the truth. The 
other conflict, or incompatibility, is between the Old Man’s and by and large the 
society’s O-world of incest and the half-sibling’s W-world of love. Eddie and May 
in the movie are shown simply as lovers in the foreground and their W-worlds 
of love are passionately enhanced in two main ways. First, there is the charac-
ter of the Countess who is just mentioned in the play, but shown in the movie 
to highlight the amorous relationship between the main characters. Secondly, 
there is the character of Martin whose presence in the movie creates a sort of 
competition over May. Also, the other pertinent incompatibility occurs between 
Eddie and May’s K-world and W-world as they are aware of the facts in their life 
and know that their relationship is not morally right; yet, they insist on fulfilling 
their desire. 
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Conclusion
The shifts in adapted movies could be fruitfully related to the issue of the 
possible worlds. As we have tried to briefly show above, some of these shifts are 
due to the shift in medium, but some are related to the kinds of appropriations 
(formal, ideological, discursive) a director factors in his adaptation of literary 
texts. Our case study, Altman’s Fool for Love, well exemplifies this. The movie is 
an attempt to radically revise the play by adding new scenes and generally dire-
cting (the director as an “auteur” or “re-authoring” agent) the film in a way that 
the perceptions of the characters about each other and towards AW significantly 
change, not only structurally but also semantically. That is, cognitively, there are 
remarkable changes in the general orientations of the play and its film version. 
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MOGUĆI SVJETOVI U DRAMI LUD OD LJUBAVI SAMA 
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U ovom se članku usporedno analizira drama Sama Sheparda Lud od ljubavi, objavlje-
na 1983. godine, i njezina filmska adaptacija u režiji Roberta Altmana iz 1985. godine, 
pri čemu je u žarištu razmatranja koncept mogućih svjetova (iz filozofski orijentiranog 
područja kognitivne poetike). U raspravi o mogućim svjetovima Marie-Laure Ryan 
predlaže tipologiju odnosa pristupačnosti (identitet svojstava, identitet inventara, kom-
patibilnost inventara, kronološka,  tjelesna, taksonomska, logička, analitička i lingvis-
tička kompatibilnost) kako bi se utvrdilo kako se iskustvo zbilje našeg stvarnog svijeta 
odražava u fikcionalnim svjetovima. Ryan također nudi drugu tipologiju, tj. unutarn-
ju strukturu fiktivnog svijeta (svjetovi znanja, svjetovi namjere, svjetovi želja, svjetovi 
dužnosti, fantastični svjetovi) kako bi pokazala kako različite koncepcije svijeta kod 
likova definiraju i stvaraju pripovjednu strukturu fikcije. Osnovna je teza ovog rada da 
promjena medija – u ovom slučaju iz drame u film – rezultira određenim promjenama 
projekcije mogućih svjetova, budući da verbalnost i vizualnost dovode do nekih raz-
lika u smislu načina percepcije. U radu se također raspravlja o značaju prostorno-vre-
menskog opsega, koji je ograničen u slučaju drame, žanra često namijenjenog izvedbi, 
dok je u filmu redatelj u mogućnosti prema potrebi proširiti taj opseg.
Ključne riječi: Sam Shepard, Lud od ljubavi, Robert Altman, Marie-Laure Ryan, prila-
godba, naratologija, mogući svjetovi
